Colonels and generals are expected to fight moving, active battles, always seeking an advantage from the use of terrain, surprise and mobility. |
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Generals are expected to concentrate defending forces in front of the main thrusts of the enemy so that the fighting troops do not have to meet a greater ratio of strength against them than three or four to one. |
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… |
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The captains and their troops have learned that modern weapons in the defense can and should inflict losses on an attacker, in comparison to their own, of well over three to one. They have learned, in short, that a successful defense against considerable odds is possible. |
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— General Sir John Hackett (Ret.) |
From his book: “The Third World War: A Future History“ |
The book was “written” by General Hackett and “others” and purported to be a “future history” of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The “war” ends following a limited tactical nuclear exchange which leads to a revolution in Russia. |
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[With the delays in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, much has been said about the failure to overwhelm the militarily over-matched defenders. |
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|
Ukraine |
vs |
Russia |
(In Theater) |
|
|
|
|
|
Armed Forces |
200,000 |
|
850,000 |
200,000 |
Fighter Aircraft |
69 |
|
772 |
193 |
Attack Aircraft |
29 |
|
739 |
185 |
Helicopters |
112 |
|
1,543 |
386 |
Attack Helicopters |
34 |
|
544 |
136 |
Tanks |
2,596 |
|
12,420 |
3,105 |
Personnel Carriers |
12,303 |
|
30,122 |
7,531 |
Self-Propelled Artillery |
1,067 |
|
6,574 |
1,644 |
Towed Artillery |
2,040 |
|
7,571 |
1,893 |
Mobile Rocket Launchers |
490 |
|
3,391 |
848 |
|
|
What isn’t clear to me is how many of Russia’s forces are actually “in theater” and committed to the invasion. The numbers I’ve seen indicate approximately “200,000” Russians were gathered for the invasion. This is (again approximately) 25% of Russia’s forces. If we assume a similar ratio across the board for other assets, the numbers are far less indicative of an assured success for the invasion. |
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In military theory, it is almost a given that the attacker needs a six-to-one superiority in order to have a reasonable “guarantee” of success against a prepared defense. (This is why you concentrate forces at breakout / breakthrough points.) Three-to-one superiority is considered the bare minimum to have a reasonable “expectation” of success. |
|
Based on the above numbers, the “only” Russian advantage is in attack aircraft (29 vs 185). This is an even greater advantage than just the numbers indicate as attack aircraft serve as force multipliers for both your tanks and your ground forces. |
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IMHO this invasion will succeed or fail based on three factors: logistics, will and geography. If the Russian forces can maintain their supply of fuel and ammunition, they will have the advantage in a war of attrition. If Ukraine can maintain their will to fight in the face of both heavy civilian losses and questionable munitions resupply from other countries, they will make the war / occupation unsustainable for Russia. Finally, we should recall Russia invaded and then dominated Afghanistan for almost twenty years before finally being driven out. Afghanistan is roughly the size of Texas. Texas is only about 10-15% larger than Ukraine. There is a vast amount of land to hide in and fight from IF you have the will to do so. So far, the Ukraine people have shown the will… |
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Of course, all of this assumes Russia does not choose a tactical nuclear option… — kmab] |
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On This Day In: |
2023 |
Webs |
2022 |
Against Considerable Odds |
2021 |
Only 10 |
|
Just A Hopeless Case (Can’t Get Used To Losing You) |
2020 |
What We Know About Ourselves |
2019 |
But It Feels Dirtier Lately |
2018 |
I Remember Some More Than Others |
2017 |
Creating Reality |
2016 |
Come, Read To Me Some Poem |
2015 |
Exceeding Service |
2014 |
Still Learning |
|
Hospitality |
2013 |
Execution Not Intensity |
2012 |
Charles Carroll Of Carrollton (The Only Catholic Founder) |
2011 |
Life Works |
|
Pay Like Hell |
|
Prosperity Finds Its Way Up |
|
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