The fighting could hardly have gone on for very long in any case. Neither side could have sustained for more than a few weeks the expenditure of aircraft and of missile and other stocks – of fuel, for example, and of all manner of warlike stores and equipment – demanded in the modern battle. Even if the production of munitions of war in the home bases had been possible at the rate at which they were used up on the battlefield, it is doubtful whether, with hostile interference to the lines of communication, supply could ever have kept up with consumption. | |
The Soviet concept of the application of armed force for the purpose of securing a political advantage, in the state of the art in the last twenty years of the twentieth century and in the circumstances of the time, was thus wholly rational. It was facing an adversary relatively weak in the first instance but disposing of potentially overwhelming resources. Late twentieth-century war consumed material in such enormous quantities as to put very long drawn-out operations out of the question. It was imperative, therefore, to secure a position of great political advantage in a short, sharp, violent encounter, starting with the offensive initiative, exploiting as far as possible the advantages of surprise and of a somewhat longer period of preparation than the enemy’s, and reaching a chosen strategic objective before the enemy could bring his superior resources to bear and while stocks were still sufficient to sustain intensive action. | |
— General Sir John Hackett (et al) | |
From: “The Third World War: August 1985“ | |
[This quote is very similar to one I offered a few days ago. The point is the same and it is one which was repeated in the cited book: modern warfare needs to be quick and over. It is also “best” when conducted by proxies rather than principals – particularly if it can’t be either brief or decisive. This is because of the logistic and manufacturing requirements of modern warfare. You need to have a large stock of logistics – ammunition, trained warriors and supplies – AND you need the ability to replenish the logistics as quickly and as continuously as possible. National / internal manufacturing is better than buying internationally because it shortens your supply chain. The counter to this is that it makes your manufacturing base an object of attack for an enemy seeking to break your logistics chain. This is why factories are strategic targets. — kmab] | |
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Posts Tagged ‘Modern Warfare’
Brevity And Decisiveness
Posted in Philosophy, Quotes, tagged General Sir John Hackett (Ret.), Logistics, Modern Warfare, Philosophy, Quotes, The Third World War: August 1985 on May 16, 2022| 3 Comments »
Long Past Time For A “Thorough-going Reappraisal”
Posted in Economics, Philosophy, Politics, Quotes, tagged Economics, Fuel And Munitions, General Sir John Hackett (Ret.), Middle East, Modern Warfare, Philosophy, Politics, Quotes, Russia, Second World War, Soviet Union, Speed, The Third World War: August 1985, Ukraine on May 14, 2022| Leave a Comment »
In absolute terms, moreover, the mass and volume (to say nothing of the cost) of all that was required, particularly in fuel and munitions, to maintain an army in field operations at an intensive rate against a similarly equipped opponent, was now very great. It had taken a quantitative jump since the Second World War. Warfare in the Middle East in the seventies had shown this very clearly, if on relatively small scale. It was just no longer possible, at the rate at which stocks could now be exhausted, to sustain intensive operations of war for months on end. Head – and equipment – counts were no longer the true measure of an army’s capability. Formation in large numbers could be a liability rather than an advantage unless they could be kept effectively in action. | |
The Soviet war-fighting philosophy, from whatever origins it may been evolved, was in the circumstances of the 1980s exactly right. It enjoined the initiation of total and violent offensive action, swiftly followed through to the early attainment of a valuable objective. The position of military advantage thus secured would then be exploited by political means. Speed was everything. The corollary was that failure to secure the objective in good time must result in a thorough-going reappraisal, in which to continue to press towards the same end might very well be the least sensible course. | |
— General Sir John Hackett (et al) | |
From the “future-history” novel: “The Third World War: August 1985“ | |
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